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Abstract 
Safety instrumented systems (SIS) are used in different industrial areas and household applications in order to protect 
humans, the environment and assets. This article presents a fire warning system, which is a typical SIS application, in 
a student apartment. And the paper focus on the reliability assessment of the alarm system. Such reliability 
assessment is important to ensure the safety critial systems. Standard reiability parameters and two reliabiility 
measures PFD and spurious trip rate analyses of the system are carried out for each safety instrumented function. 
Based on the calculated result, system configuration of such system can be selected. And decision of implementing 
such a system or not can be made. From the reliability analysis of a fire alarm system, both the risk reduction effect 
and side effect of using such a system can be better understood. It is acceptable for use in an apartment. Thereafter 
several risk reducing measures are introduced. No big change is needed. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of ICAE2011. 
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1. Introduction
Safety instrumented systems (SIS) are used in different industrial areas and household applications in
order to protect humans, the environment and assets. A SIS can usually be split in to three different 
elements: input element (various sensors, transmits), logic unit (PLC, relay based logic, etc) and final 
element (alarm, valve, sprinkle, etc), see figure 1. The mandatory requirement of being defined as a SIS is 
that the safety system must include at least one element utilizing E/E/PE technology. 
The main standard used in design, manufacturing, installation and follow up of safety instrumented 
systems is IEC 61508. This is a generic standard which applies to all SISs; sector specified standards are 
also published to guide specific applications, for example IEC 61511 for process industry. 
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Fig. 1. Three elements of SIS 
For a safety instrumented system, the reliability requirements should be allocated, implemented and 
verified. All these steps shall be carried out according to IEC 61508 and other applicable standards or 
guidelines. One SIS may have several safety instrumented functions (SIFs), for example, a fire detection 
system could have both alarm and sprinkle. Thus, the reliability requirement needs to be allocated to each 
SIF instead of a SIS. 
Safety integrity level (SIL) is used to measure the reliability of SIS. For a low demand system the each 
SIL gives different requirement on probability of failure on demand (PFD), while probability of failure 
per hour (PFH) is used in high demand system, see table 1. 
Table 1. SIL-PFD-PFH 
SIL PFD PFH 
4 >10-5<10-4 >10-9<10-8
3 >10-4<10-3 >10-8<10-7
2 >10-3<10-2 >10-7<10-6 
1 >10-2<10-1 >10-6<10-5
This article analyses a fire warning system, which is a typical SIS application, in a student apartment. 
PFD and spurious trip rate analyses of the system are carried out for each safety instrumented function. 
Thereafter several risk reducing measures are introduced. 
2. System description 
Automatic fire warning systems are installed in buildings in the student village. When fire or smokes 
disperse, the smoke detectors detect the fire and the alarm will be trigged automatically, at the same time 
the fire alarm signal will be transmitted to security department who is responsible for fire. A triggered 
alarm can only be switched off by Caretakers, Security officers or the other authorized person. 
Fig. 2. Sketch of the apartment and the location of detectors 
There are five detectors, in total, installed in bedrooms and kitchen of each apartment, when only one 
detector detects a fire in the bedroom or kitchen, a red light in the detector is turned on and a local alarm 
will be activated. This alarm only affects the responsible apartment, the security department will be 
informed and they will take contact, but evacuation of the building is not necessary. If two or more smoke 
detectors detect a fire, then a major alarm will be activated in the whole building, the security department 
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will be informed and they will take contact, and in this case the whole building is supposed to evacuate. 
The sketch of the apartment and the location of detectors can been found in Figure 2. 
All the fire detectors used in the apartments are smoke detector of the same type. There is no battery 
inside the detectors and they cannot be disconnected. 
3. Reliability analysis 
3.1. Relevant data 
Data of the fire alarm system is obtained from the OREDA handbook (some of the data may be modify 
with considerations the actually situation), individual judgments (assessment based on the guidelines) and 
assumptions. 
For the PFD calculation, the following data or parameters of input element, logic unit and final 
element are required: the functional test interval, the dangerous undetectable failure rate, beta factor for 
failure and the correction factors used in PDS method (Reference to PDS meothod handbook). For our 
system, the logic unit is so reliable, so we assume it will not fail, thus the relevant data concerning logic 
unit is omitted. The final element in this system include the sound alarm in the building and the signal 
transmitting system to the security department, however, we take them as one element with a single 
failure rate for the sake of simplicity. 
Functional test interval: 2 years (17280 hours) 
DU failure rate of final element: 7FE 10*0.7
  per hour 
DU failure rate of smoke detector: 7FE 10*0.8
  per hour 
Beta factor: 12.0
Correction factor for 4OO5 fail due to CCFs: C1oo5=0.08
Correction factor for 5OO5 fail due to CCFs: C5oo5=0.45
For spurious rate calculation, the following data or parameters of input element, logic unit and final 
element are required: the rate of spurious activation, beta factor for spurious operation, the false demand 
rate, the dangerous detectable (DD) failure rate, beta factor for DD failure, the rate of loss of utilities. 
However, experience shows that the spurious trips for the fire warning system in the student village are 
mainly resulted from the false demand during cooking, all other causes are not comparable with false 
demand, there can actually be neglected. Thus only the following data are used 
Spurious activation of fire detector: -6IEso, 10*1.4  per hour 
Spurious activation of final element: -6FEso, 10*1.4  per hour 
False demand: 4FD 10*2
  per hour
Note the false alarm rate here includes both type A and type B false demand 
3.2. PFD and spurious rate calculation 
The fire alarm system has two SIFs, namely local alarm and major alarm. Each SIF should be subject 
to PFD and Spurious Rate calculation separately. For local alarm, the detectors are in a 1-out-of-5 
configuration, while for the major alarm the detectors are in a 2-out-of-5 configuration, and the rest of the 
system is the same including a logic unit(treated as reliable element) and final elements (treated as s 
single element). 
The PFD calculation is performed using the approximation formulas; the common cause failure is 
treated by the PDS method. The reason for choosing the approximation formulas is that the systems are 
1OO5 and 2OO5 configurations, the Markov method may not be a good choice since 5 components will 
introduce lots of states. The Markov method is not efficient to handle big systems and the approximation 
formula is sufficient in this case. The PDS method instead of ordinary Beta factor model is use due to the 
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facts that the common cause failure will dominate the PFD. If the Beta factor model is used, there will be 
not different between 1OO5 and 1OO2. This is apparently not the real situation. 
3.3. PFD calculation 
The system PFD can be calculated by taking the sum of contributions of PFDs from three different 
elements, see formula (1) 
PFD=PFD(IE)+PFD(LU)+PFD(FE)                                                                                 (1) 
Where: 
PFD(IE) is the contribution of PFD from the input element 
PFD(LU) is the contribution of PFD from the logic unit 
PFD(FE) is the contribution of PFD from the final element 
The contribution of PFD from the logic unit is not accounted here, since the logic unit is so reliable 
compare to other element. 
The contribution of PFD from the final element PFD(FE) is assumed to be the same to both local and 
major alarm. And the calculation uses the approximation formula (2) from Rausand's “System Reliability 
Theory: Models, Statistical Methods and Applications. ” Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, 2nd edition. 
PFD(FE)=(λFEτ)/2                                                                                                          (2) 
Put the data into formula (2): 
PFD(FE)=(1.0*10-7*17280)/2=6.048*10-3
The contribution of PFD from the input element is different for local and major alarm. 
3.4. For local alarm 
The detectors are in a 1-out-of-5 configuration, this is actually a parallel system, so PFD(IE) can be 
calculated using formula (3). 
PFD(FE)local=PFD(FE)
I+PFDC(FE)=((1-β)λDUτ)5/6+C1oo5*(βλDUτ)/2                  (3) 
Put the data into formula (3) 
5
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We can see the common cause failure is the major contributor to the PFD in local alarm, so the 
independent failure can be neglected. 
Thus The PFD for the local alarm is: PFD=6.048*10-3+6.636*10-5=6.11*10-3.
This function of local alarm is SIL 2 
3.5. For major alarm 
The detectors are in a 2-out-of-5 configuration, so PFD(IE) can be calculated using formula (4). 
2
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Put the data into the formula (4) 
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We can see the common cause failure is still the major contributor to the PFD in major alarm, so the 
independent failure can be neglected. 
Thus the PFD for the local alarm is: PFD=6.048*10-3+3.73*10-4=6.42*10-3.
This function of major alarm is SIL 2. 
3.6. Spurious rate calculation 
For a fire alarm system in the student village, false alarm happens from time to time, it is really 
annoying when this is too often, and a major alarm may cause the evacuation of the whole building, 
which causes lots of trouble, so the spurious rate of fire alarm needs to be calculated and reduced. 
According to M. A. Lundteigen, the followings contribute to spurious trip: 
1.Internal spurious operations of elements 
2.False demands which include both type A and type B false demands 
3.Dangerous detectable(DD) failure depending on the operation philosophy 
4.Loss of utilities 
In our system, the DD failure is not regarded and spurious trip and the loss of utilities will not cause 
spurious trio neither. So only internal spurious operation of elements and false demands counts 
The spurious trip is measure by spurious trip rate STR. 
STR=STRI+STRF                                                                                                                                                               (5) 
Where: 
STRI is the contribution of STR from internal failure 
STRF is the contribution of STR from false alarm
3.7. For local alarm 
The contribution of STR from internal failure can be calculate using formula (6) 
FEso,IEso,IEso,
I )-(1*5STR                                                  (6)
Put data into (6) gives: STRI=7.728*10-6
The contribution of STR from internal failure can be calculate using formula (7) 
)1(*STR FD
F
localPFD                                                                             (7)
Put the data into (7) gives: STRF=1.99*10-4
The total STR for a local alarm is therefore: 7.728*10-6+1.99*10-4=2.07*10-4 per hour 
3.8. For major alarm 
From the calculation of local alarm, it is obvious that false demand is the dominating cause of spurious 
operation in our case, the contribution of internal failure can therefore be omitted. For major false alarm, 
the contribution of internal failure is even small than in the local false alarm situation, thus we can omit 
the internal failure contribution in the calculation. 
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Put the data into (7) gives: STRF=1.99*10-4
The total STR for a major alarm is therefore:  1,987*10-4 per hour 
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4. Suggested strategies 
The problem with fire alarm system in apartment of student is mainly spurious operations. Lots of 
false fire alarms have been experienced, especially in apartments with Asian student. The cooking habits 
of these students lead to generation of smoke during cooking, and the kitchen fan in the apartment is not 
strong enough to take away all the smoke. 
The following suggestions are made to this issue. 
1. Make sure the kitchen fan is turned on during cooking. Even though the capacity of the fan is not 
enough in some cases. Using kitchen still reduce the false demands significantly. 
2. Make sure the bedroom doors are closed. A major false alarm will only be trigger when at least 2 
or more than 2 detectors detect false demand. Closure of bedroom will reduce the major false alarm to a 
large extent.  
3. Replace the smoke based fire detector in the kitchen when other types of detector. Most 
experienced false alarm is caused by smoke generated during, if the detector is not based on smoke, this 
kind of spurious will be omitted. 
For the reliability of the fire alarm system, it is acceptable for use in an apartment. No big change is 
needed.  
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